



A Tale of Two Index Futures: The Intraday Price Discovery Process between the China 
Financial Futures Exchange and the Singapore Exchange  
 
Abstract 
This is the first study to examine the intraday price discovery process between the Singapore 
Exchange and the China Financial Futures Exchange. Using one- and five-minute high-
frequency data from May to November 2011, we found that China’s CSI 300 index futures 
dominated Singapore’s A50 index futures in terms of the price discovery process. However, 
A50 futures contracts also made a substantial contribution (26%-37%) to the price discovery 
process. A further division of the sample period into two sub-periods found that A50 futures 
dominated the price discovery process from May to August 2011 and that CSI 300 futures 
dominated the process from August to November 2011. These results have important 
implications for both traders and policymakers.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
On September 5, 2006, the Singapore Exchange issued SGX FTSE Xinhua China A50 index 
futures, which remain the only offshore futures on China’s broad A-share markets. Three days 
later, the China Financial Futures Exchange (CFFEX) was established in Shanghai, which 
began the four-year-long preparation for China’s own index futures. On September 18, 2006, 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange filed a lawsuit against FTSE XINHUA Co., claiming that its 
permission for the Singapore Exchange’s use of data provided by the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange to compile the A50 index was illegal. In November 2006, the Shanghai court ruled 
in favor of the Shanghai Stock Exchange and fined FTSE XINHUA Co. USD 20,000. The 
latter appealed to the higher court but was rejected, ending the year-long legal battle. 
Witnessing the ever-decreasing trading volume of A50 futures, the Singapore Exchange 
reduced the contract size in November 2007 to increase the trading volume but saw it slide 
back to almost zero volume by the end of 2008. On April 16, 2010, the CFFEX finally 
introduced its long-awaited CSI 300 index futures after a four-year experiment based on 
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mock trading between large qualified domestic institutions. In response, on August 23, 2010, 
the Singapore Exchange made substantial revisions to A50 futures contract specifications to 
increase its competitiveness. The contract size was reduced to USD 1 from USD 10 multiples 
of the futures price. Both T and T+1 sessions offered extended trading hours: The lunch break 
was cancelled for a continuous T session from 9 a.m. to 3:30 p.m., and the T+1 session traded 
from 4:10 p.m. to 1:00 a.m. the next day, which was later extended to 2 a.m. In addition, the 
initial margin was reduced from USD 1500 to USD 688. Table 1 shows the revisions made by 
the Singapore Exchange so far, which reflect a clear trend: extended trading hours and 
reduced entry barriers, contract sizes, and margin requirements.  
 
This fierce competition between exchanges in China and Singapore for a dominant role in 
China’s A-share index futures contracts has received considerable attention from global 
investors, media, and policymakers for several reasons. First, the Singapore Exchange 
introduced SGX Nikkei 225 Index Futures and SGX MSCI Taiwan Index Futures well before 
these two markets introduced their own futures contracts. Previous studies have shown that 
these offshore contracts have had considerable influence on the domestic markets (e.g., 
Roope & Zurbreugg, 2002; Covrig, Ding & Low, 2004; Chung & Hseu, 2008; Hsieh & Ma, 
2008). Second, China is the latest market to introduce its own financial futures. Thus, its 
success has critical implications for the introduction of more advanced financial derivative 
products such as index and stock options. Many foreign institutions are interested in such 
potential investment opportunities in China’s expanding financial markets. Third, in the short 
run, CSI 300 futures are likely to remain the only domestic financial product that investors 
can use to hedge against or speculate on China’s broad A-share markets. The competition 
between CSI 200 futures and A50 futures may directly influence the investment decision and 
profitability of those investors who rely heavily on the direction of information flow. This 
issue has become particularly relevant because, since the last contract revisions by the 





In this regard, the present paper investigates the role of the Singapore Exchange in the 
competition for China’s index futures markets. Specifically, the paper examines the pair wise 
price discovery processes between the CSI 300 index, newly introduced CFFEX CSI 300 
index futures, SGX FTSE Xinhua China A50 index, and A50 index futures markets. Although 
the A50 futures market’s trading volume is approximately one tenth that of the CSI 300 
futures market and the A50 futures market has not impacted China’s A-share markets as much 
as initially hoped, the Singapore Exchange does have several advantages in positioning the 
A50 index futures market as a major destination for foreign institutional investors who wish 
to hedge against or speculate on China’s stock markets. First, the A50 index futures market 
has much lower entry barriers for investors. Its contract size is only one thirteenth that of CSI 
futures, and its initial margin is even lower. Second, the A50 futures market opens 15 minutes 
earlier and closes 10 minutes later than the CSI futures market. In addition, there is no lunch 
break in the A50 futures market. Third, the A50 futures market has an additional T+1 session 
that last until 2 a.m. the next day. When the market has unexpected news during extended T 
and T+1 sessions, the only place where investors can trade is the A50 futures market. Fourth, 
the A50 futures contract is settled in USD, which is particularly convenient for Western 
investors. Table 2 provides a comparison of A50 and CSI 300 index futures specifications. 
Thus, the A50 futures market now has the potential to compete with and possibly lead the 
CSI 300 futures market. The price discovery process between the two index futures 
represents an interesting and meaningful research question. However, although a number of 
studies have examined the price discovery process between SGX Nikkei 225 (SGX MSCI 
Taiwan) index futures and Nikkei 225 index futures (TAIFEX futures), few have addressed 
this process between A50 and CSI 300 index futures.  
 
This study employs conventional methods in the price discovery literature, including the 
Granger causality test, the Hasbrouck information share, and the Gonzalo and Granger 
information share. Consistent with the findings of previous studies considering other markets, 
the present study’s results indicate that each futures market dominated the corresponding spot 
market. The CSI (A50) futures market dominated the CSI (A50) spot market, representing a 
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76% (76%) information share at the one-minute frequency and a 61% (84%) information 
share at the five-minute frequency. Despite its relatively thin trading volume, A50 futures 
contributed 23%-26% at the one-minute frequency and 24%-36% at the five-minute 
frequency to price discovery process between the two futures markets, implying that after a 
year and a half, the CSI 300 futures market became mature and assumed its function as a 
leading marketplace for the price discovery process. We divided the sample period into two 
subperiods and found that A50 futures dominated CSI futures between May and August 2011 
(the first half of the sample period), which is inconsistent with the common perception that 
the CSI futures market, with its much higher trading volume, is the leading place for trades 
based on new information. These results provide strong evidence that the Singapore 
Exchange does have an advantage in its competition with the CFFEX and suggests that the 
latter should maintain its efforts despite its recent achievements in the price discovery 
function. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the two index futures 
markets. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical results using the full-
sample data. A further analysis breaking the sample into two sub-periods is reported in 
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. CSI 300 INDEX FUTURES AND A50 INDEX FUTURES 
CSI 300 index futures are traded on the CFFEX, and its underlying asset is the CSI 300 index, 
which is composed with the 300 largest A-shares listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange (179 
stocks) and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (121 stocks) by China Securities Index Co., Ltd. 
The trading volume of CSI 300 index futures increased sharply from 5,487,908 to 7,536,922 
contracts in the first three months of trading, and the total turnover was over RMB 6,000 
billion as of 2010. Figure 1 shows the daily trading volume from the first day of trading to 
November 21, 2011. There was a small decrease in average trading volume after August 23, 
2010, when the Singapore Exchange revised its A50 futures contract specifications, but it 
increased since the latter half of 2011. 
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[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
The CSI 300 index futures market is completely order-driven. There is no market maker, and 
trading is conducted using a central computer system that matches buy and sell orders. 
Regular trading hours are from 09:15 to 11:30 and from 13:00 to 15:15, which means that it 
opens 15 minutes earlier and closes 15 minutes later than the spot market. However, for the 
purpose of price convergence, on each settlement day, the futures market closes at the same 
time as the spot market (15:00). Five types of futures contracts are traded simultaneously. 
Their expiration dates fall over the next three consecutive months and the two nearest 
quarter-end months (i.e., March, June, September, and December). The third Friday of each 
month is the settlement day, and the settlement price is calculated as the arithmetic average of 
the spot CSI 300 index during the last two trading hours of that day. The contract multiplier 
for each point is set as RMB 300. Regulators set RMB 500,000 as the minimum amount for 
opening a futures trading account, and the initial margin for each futures contract is 12% of 
its total value, that is, 12%*300*current futures price. The strict entry condition and the high-
margin requirement limit noise traders. Similar to the spot market, the futures market has a 
daily price limit of ±10% with respect to the settlement price of the last trading day. In 
addition, there is a “circuit breaker” set at ±6%. Specifically, when changes in the daily 
futures price exceed ±6% and last for more than a minute, the circuit breaker is activated, and 
in the following 10 minutes, the bid/ask quotes are restricted to a range between -6% and 6%. 
Any quotes beyond this range are automatically denied. After 10 minutes, the price limit is 
expanded to ±10%, and normal trading activities resume. The circuit breaker is designed as a 
cooling-off system for stabilizing the market in extremely volatile conditions. 
 
Few studies have focused on the CSI 300 index futures market because it is relatively new. 
Yang, Yang, and Zhou (2011) examined the price discovery process between the CSI 300 
index and CSI 300 index futures markets by using high-frequency data from April 16, 2010, 
to July 30, 2010, and found that during this early stage, the CSI 300 futures market lagged 
behind the spot market in information flow and that there was some bidirectional intraday 
volatility transmission between the two markets. However, these findings are not consistent 
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with the results of the present study, which considers a longer and more recent sample period. 
 
SGX FTSE Xinhua A50 index futures are written on the SGX FTSE Xinhua A50 index, 
which is a tradable index composed of the largest 50 A-share firms by full market 
capitalization. They are stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange and account for approximately 45% of the total market capitalization of the 
A-share market. The index is strongly correlated with the CSI 300 index and A-share ETFs, 
and major investors (including foreign institutions such as QFIIs and hedge funds) employ 
A50 futures to hedge against, speculate on, or invest in China’s A-share markets. Unlike in 
the pure order-driven CSI 300 futures market, there are market makers for A50 futures. In 
addition, there are substantial differences in contract specifications between the two futures 
contracts. The contract months for A50 futures are the two nearest serial months and March, 
June, September, and December on a one-year cycle. The last trading day is the second-last 
business day of the contract month. Unlike in the case of CSI 300 futures, the final settlement 
price is the official closing price of the A50 index rounded to the nearest two decimal places. 
Compared with 10% price limits for CSI 300 futures, those for A50 futures are set to be 10% 
and 15% from the previous day’s settlement price. When each limit is reached, there is a 10-
minute cooling-off period, after which no price limits are set for the rest of the day. As shown 
in Figure 1, one striking phenomenon is that the trading volume, which was extremely low 
before the contract revisions in August 2010, increased sharply since then. This study is 
motivated by this observation. 
 
3. DATA DESCRIPTION 
We considered a sample period from May 9, 2011, to November 21, 2011, when the CSI 300 
index futures market was in operation for more than a year and it had been nine months since 
the Singapore Exchange revised its A50 futures contract specifications. In addition, both 
markets were mature enough for an analysis of the price discovery process. Over the sample 
period, the CSI 300 spot index decreased from 3,164 to around 2,500 (Figure 2). 
[Insert Figure 2 about here.] 
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We obtained one-minute data on the CSI 300 index, CSI 300 index futures, the A50 index, 
and A50 index futures from Bloomberg via Nanhua Futures Co., a leading futures brokerage 
and research institute in China. We employed the mid-quote price in the bid-ask spread to 
construct the price series. Because the four markets had different trading hours, we 
considered the common trading hours from 9:35 a.m. to 11:25 a.m. and from 1:05 p.m. to 
2:55 p.m. for each trading day. We excluded the first and last five minutes in each trading 
session to avoid noise trades during opening and closing hours.1 To construct a continuous 
series of futures contracts, we selected only the most active futures contracts, that is, we 
considered the contracts with the nearest maturity dates but excluded those with less than one 
week to maturity to avoid expiration day effects. A50 futures are traded in USD, whereas CSI 
300 futures, in RMB. Thus, A50 futures prices should ideally be adjusted by the RMB/USD 
exchange rate. However, there was little change in this exchange rate over the sample period 
because of China’s policy of managed floating rates: The average daily change in the 
exchange rate was -0.01% (S.D. =0.11%). For this reason, we analyzed only unadjusted A50 
futures prices.2 In addition, we normalized the four series by setting the first-day price/the 
index value in each series to be 1,000. As a result, we obtained a total of 29,541 data points 
for each series.  
 
To examine how the price discovery process evolved over time intervals, we constructed a 
five-minute price series for each market. Following Roope and Zurbreugg (2002), we took 
the average of the two closest prices on both sides of the five-minute breaker to remove the 
potential downward bias from the use of the price closest to the five-minute breaker. We 
conducted all the tests for both one-minute and five-minute series.  
 
                                                              
1 We included the last five minutes in the morning session and the first five minutes in the afternoon 
session but found no qualitative differences in results.  
2 Ideally, we should have used the one-minute exchange rate for the adjustment, but we could obtain 
no intraday data. However, we expected no substantial impact on the results because we conducted 
the analysis based on the log return of the price series, not on the price itself. That is, taking the log of 
the price removes most the variations in the exchange rate, which should not be large for a managed 
floating rate. We conducted an additional analysis and verified that the use of the daily FX-adjusted 
price series had no influence on the results. 
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To examine the four markets’ comovement, we took the log of one-minute (five-minute) 
returns for all series and computed their correlations (Table 3).3 As shown in Panel A, for the 
one-minute interval, CSI spot and futures returns showed little synchronization, that is, there 
was a low correlation (0.35) between the returns. This may be because in practice it typically 
takes a hedger more than one minute to execute a buy/sell order for all 300 stocks in the 
index. In comparison, A50 spot and futures returns showed some co-movement 
(correlation=0.67), possibly because only about 15 seconds are needed to execute an order for 
A50 component stocks. This difference reflects the advantage of the Singapore futures market 
over the Chinese futures market in terms of the adjustment speed and hedging efficiency 
relative to each spot market. The two futures markets had the highest correlation (0.73), and 
the correlation between the two spot markets was 0.63, indicating some information flow 
between Singapore and China. Panel B shows the correlations for the five-minute return 
series. For longer time intervals, more information was incorporated into prices, and thus, 
there were substantial increases in all the correlations. For example, the correlation between 
CSI spot and futures returns increased sharply to 0.75, and that between the two spot (futures) 
markets increased to 0.91 (0.89). 
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for each series. The results of the ADF test indicate 
that all price series fail to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root but that the return series 
justified the assumption of stationarity. As discussed in the next section, checking for 
stationarity was crucial for price discovery computations. The two futures series were less 
skewed and heavy-tailed than their spot series at the one-minute frequency but had 
approximately the same high moments at the five-minute frequency. In addition, for all series, 
five-minute returns had much less excess kurtosis than one-minute returns because of the 
smoothing effect.  




3 We excluded the first log return to avoid the bias associated with overnight returns. 
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4. METHODS AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We employed three well-known techniques to examine the price discovery processes between 
the four markets. To apply these methods, we first checked whether the four price series 
shared a common long-run stochastic trend. Intuitively, the four markets should share a 
common driving force, that is, the Chinese A-share stock market. We conducted the standard 
Johansen (1991) trace test to determine the number of common long-run trends (Table 5).4 
Panels A and B of Table 5 show three cointegration vectors for the one-minute series at the 
5% level of significance and for the five-minute series at the 10% level, indicating a single 
long-run equilibrium point for the four series. Based on these results, we investigated the 
price discovery processes between the two futures markets, between the two indices, and 
between each futures market and its underlying index.  
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
For the first method, we conducted a pairwise block exogeneity test with lagged returns for 
the four series. Equation 1 shows an error correction model (ECM) for markets i and j:  
 , (1) 
where p denotes the price vector; α represents the adjustment speed for markets i and j; βk is 
the autoregressive coefficient for lag k; N is the number of lags (N=15); and Dt is a trend 
term. 5  Equation 1 separates short-term effects from long-term ones, allowing for the 
determination of whether market j Granger-causes market i (via a joint test that all 
coefficients βj,k are significantly different from zero) and whether market j is adjusting toward 
market i through a test of the statistical significance of α. 
 
Panel A of Table 6 indicates that there were bidirectional lead-lag relationships between 
Singapore and China at the one-minute frequency but that the A50 futures market did not 
                                                              
4 Because of the deterministic decreasing trend during the sample period (Figure 2), we conducted the 
Johansen trace test by assuming a linear trend component. The results of a unit root test for the four 
detrended series verify that all the detrended series were I (1) processes. We selected the optimal 15 
lags for the Johansen trace test by using the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and employed the 
same lag structure for the rest of empirical analyses. 
5 All the tests assumed the existence of a linear trend component. 
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have a significant effect on the movement of the CSI 300 futures market at the 10% level. For 
each spot-futures pair, the futures market was more likely to influence its spot index than the 
other way round, as indicated by the F-statistic. For example, the F-value for the test that CSI 
300 (A50) futures did not Granger-cause CSI 300 (A50) spot index was 969.59 (85.46), 
whereas that for the test that CSI 300 spot index did not Granger-cause CSI 300 futures was 
2.42 (44.27). A50 spot was much more likely to Granger-cause CSI 300 spot price than the 
other way round, suggesting that in the spot market, A50 investors react to new market 
information faster than CSI 300 investors because the A50 index includes the largest 50 A-
share firms. The results for the adjustment speed reveal three important points. First, the 
speed coefficient for the futures market was lower than that for the spot market for both 
Singapore and China, indicating that the spot market was more likely to adjust toward the 
futures market than the other way round. Second, the speed coefficient for the A50 futures 
market was much higher than that for the CSI 300 futures market, indicating that the A50 
futures market tended to adjust toward the CSI 300 futures market. Third, the coefficients for 
both the A50 and CSI 300 spot markets were significant at the 10% level, although the 
coefficient for the A50 was higher, indicating the mutual adjustment of these two markets. 
This result is not surprising because these two markets, roughly speaking, represent the same 
Chinese market. The results for the coarser five-minute level (Panel B) indicate similar 
observations. However, the effects of the two spot markets on their respective futures markets 
were weaker and insignificant, indicating that the spot markets led the futures markets only 
temporarily. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
For the second method, we employed Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share, which measures 
the contribution of a particular market to the total variation in common trend innovations that 
drive two markets. Table 7 shows the mean and upper/lower bounds of information shares for 
each pair of the four markets. The results indicate that CSI futures contributed more to the 
price discovery process than A50 futures. However, A50 futures also made substantial 
contributions (26%-37%) to the total variation in price common trend innovations. This 
finding, although being reasonable due to the relatively small size of the trading volume for 
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A50 futures, is revealing because previously investors and Exchange policy makers have 
expected a much smaller role played by the A50 futures in the price discovery process 
between the two markets. Between the two spot markets the A50 spot market contributed 
approximately 40% to the price discovery process. This is consistent with the result of the 
Granger causality test in Table 6, which indicated the mutual influence of the spot markets. In 
addition, the results confirm that both CSI futures and A50 futures dominated their respective 
spot markets. Yang, Yang, and Zhou (2011) reported that CSI futures did not play a leading 
role in the price discovery process for the first three and a half months, possibly because of 
high entry barriers. The present study’s results indicate that in about one year after its 
introduction, the CSI futures market has established its price discovery function and 
dominated the spot market in information flow. At the five-minute frequency, results are 
qualitatively similar, but with most dominance diminished except for the CSI spot market 
versus the A50 spot market. In general, the Chinese market functioned well in terms of its 
dominant contributions to the price discovery process between the markets, indicating that 
more investors traded in the Chinese market once they had new information on China’s A-
share firms. On the other hand, the Singapore Exchange did account for some portion of price 
discovery and warrants attention from Chinese Exchange policy makers. 
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
For the final method, we employed the Gonzalo-Granger information share (Table 8). The 
results indicate similar patterns for one- and five-minute series. For instance, for the one-
minute series, the CSI 300 futures market clearly dominated the A50 futures market (77% vs. 
23%); each futures market led its spot market (76% vs. 24% for China and Singapore, 
respectively); and the CSI 300 spot market led the A50 spot market (77% vs. 23%). There are 
at least two possible reasons why the CSI 300 market dominated the A50 market. First, the 
CSI futures market and its influence grew rapidly, and thus, investors tended to enter this 
market when they had new information. Second, the authors’ conversation with futures 
traders suggests that many institutional investors employ algorithmic trading for CSI 300 
futures because of their large trading volume but that this is not the case for A50 futures.  
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
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5. SUBSAMPLE ANALYSIS 
Motivated by the dramatic increase in the trading volume of A50 futures since August 2010, 
we divided the sample period into two sub-periods with roughly equal length and conducted 
analyses separately to better examine the time-varying role of each market. Table 9 shows the 
Hasbrouck information shares for the two subperiods. In the first subperiod, Singapore 
dominated China in terms of both spot and futures markets, whereas in the second subperiod, 
China dominated Singapore in terms of both markets. More specifically, the mean share for 
the CSI 300 (A50) futures market was 36% (64%) in the first subperiod, whereas it was 75% 
(25%) in the second subperiod. For the CSI 300 (A50) spot market, the mean share changed 
from 31% (69%) to 60% (40%). However, the two futures markets still led their respective 
spot markets. These results are consistent with the Gonzalo-Granger information shares in 
Table 10. This switch in their dominance may suggest that Singapore led China in the early 
stages of competition because of its markets were convenient and familiar to overseas 
investors. As the CSI futures market grew and became more mature, investors realized its 
increasing importance, and as a result, information started to flow from China’s markets to 
Singapore’s markets. A more possibly explanation, however, is that from May to August 2011, 
the international market was the major source of information for trading, e.g. the European 
Sovereign debt crisis, US treasury rating downgrading, global economic outlook, which 
induced investors to first consider the Singapore Exchange. Then market markers hedged 
their positions by using CSI futures contracts. From August to November 2011, however, 
investor’s major focus was on domestic information in China, e.g. the Chinese inflation rate 
and macroeconomic control policy, the possibility of housing bubble burst, banking industry 
health. The attention on Chinese economy in the latter half of 2011 was highlighted when it 
was reported that large amount of hot money fled China.  In any case, CFFEX policymakers 
should recognize that A50 futures are likely to remain a powerful competitor for some time. 
[Insert Table 9 about here.] 






This paper examines the intraday price discovery processes between the CSI 300 spot, A50 
spot, CSI 300 index futures, and A50 index futures markets. The results indicate that on 
average the CSI 300 futures started to outperform A50 futures in terms of the price discovery 
process. Based on two well-known measures of the information share, CSI 300 futures led 
A50 futures and contributed more to the price discovery process. However, given that the 
A50 futures market was smaller than the CSI 300 futures market in absolute as well as 
relative terms, its 26%-37% information share was relatively large. Furthermore, the results 
of an additional analysis reveal that during the first sub-period (i.e., from May to August 
2011), A50 futures played a dominant role in the price discovery process. These results 
suggest that Chinese policymakers should continue to pay close attention to A50 futures, 
particularly because (as shown in Figure 1) the trading volume of A50 futures grew faster 
than that of CSI 300 futures since August 23, 2010. As a strategy, the Chinese futures market 
can reduce its contract sizes and entry barriers to attract more retail investors and foreign 
investors. Taiwan’s TAIFEX market played a minor role until it reduced its tax rate, which 
allowed its trading volume to surpass that of MSCI Taiwan index futures. In this regard, 
future research should examine which factors (e.g., trading volume, market makers, the T+1 
session, and information origin) play the most important roles in the price discovery function 
of A50 futures. In any case, the competition between the Singapore Exchange and the CFFEX 
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TABLE 1: COMPETITION FOR INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS BETWEEN 
EXCHANGES IN CHINA AND SINGAPORE 
 
  Before August 23, 2010 After 
Contract Size 
USD 10 * SGX A50 
Index Futures price  
USD 1 * SGX A50 
Index Futures price ≈ 
USD 8,500 
USD 1 * SGX A50 




9:15 a.m. ～  11:35 
a.m.; 1:00 p.m. ～ 
3:05 p.m.; 
T+1: 3:40 p.m. ～ 
10:55 p.m. 
9:00 a.m. ～  3:30 p.m.; 
T+1: 4:10 p.m. ～ 1:00 
p.m. (the next day) 
9:00 a.m. ～ 3:25 p.m.; 
T+1: 4:10 p.m. ～ 02:55 
a.m. (the next day) 
Margins 
Initial margin: USD 
1,500 
Initial margin: USD 688; 
Maintenance: USD 550 
Initial margin: USD 563; 
Maintenance: USD 450 
Negotiated 
Large Trades 
















TABLE 2: COMPARISON OF INDEX FUTURES CONTRACTS BETWEEN 
EXCHANGES IN CHINA AND SINGAPORE (As of 11/20/2011) 
 
Exchange CSI 300 Index Futures  SGX A50 Index Futures 
Contract Size 
CSI 300 Index Futures price * 300 
≈USD 122,646 ($/￥=6.36) 
USD 1 * SGX A50 Index Futures 
price ≈ USD 9,300 
Trading 
Hours 
9:15 a.m. ～ 11:30 a.m.; 1:00 p.m. ～ 
3:15 p.m. 
9:00 a.m. ～  3:25 p.m.; T+1: 4:10 
p.m. ～ 2:00 p.m. (the next day) 
Initial 
Margins 
12%～15% of the contract value 6% of the contract value 
Last Trading 
Day 
Third Friday of each month 




Arithmetic average of index prices in 
the last two hours on the last trading 
day 
Official closing price of the A50 






TABLE 3: CORRELATION MATRIX FOR INDEX AND INDEX FUTURES 
MARKETS (ONE- AND FIVE-MINUTE LOG RETURNS)  
 
  CSI 300 Spot CSI30 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
Panel A: Correlations for One-Minute Returns       
CSI 300 Spot 1.0000    
CSI 300 Futures 0.3506 1.0000   
A50 Spot 0.6323 0.6215 1.0000  
A50 Futures 0.4158 0.7346 0.6668 1.0000 
Panel B: Correlations for Five-Minute Returns       
CSI 300 Spot 1.0000       
CSI 300 Futures 0.7535 1.0000   
A50 Spot 0.9170 0.8437 1.0000  


















TABLE 4: SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR INDEX AND INDEX FUTURES 
MARKETS (LOG PRICES AND RETURNS)  
 
  
CSI 300 Spot CSI30 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for One-Minute Returns     
ADF (log prices) -2.2739 -2.2362 -2.4111 -2.4070 
Prob (log prices) 0.4622 0.4783 0.4040 0.4057 
ADF (returns) -42.3113 -42.6009 -42.3690 -42.3761 
Prob (returns) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 
Mean -0.0003 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0004 
Std. Dev. 0.0469 0.0662 0.0528 0.0662 
Skewness 1.3837 0.5323 1.3801 0.6061 
Excess Kurtosis 19.3851 12.1116 18.0320 7.8223 
Panel B: Summary Statistics for Five-Minute Returns     
ADF (log prices) -2.3472 -2.3450 -2.4567 -2.4566 
Prob (log prices) 0.4313 0.4322 0.3849 0.3850 
ADF (returns) -22.6207 -22.0993 -22.9433 -22.5326 
Prob (returns) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 
Mean -0.0018 -0.0027 -0.0018 -0.0023 
Std. Dev. 0.1507 0.1521 0.1430 0.1493 
Skewness 0.6666 0.6315 0.8790 0.6194 





TABLE 5: JOHANSEN TRACE TEST 
 
  Trace Prob (0.1) Prob (0.05) Prob (0.01) 
Panel A: Trace Test for One-Minute Returns   
r <= 3  5.9190 10.4900 12.2500 16.2600 
r <= 2  28.9316 22.7600 25.3200 30.4500 
r <= 1  87.4962 39.0600 42.4400 48.4500 
r = 0   241.9822 59.1400 62.9900 70.0500 
Panel B: Trace Test for Five-Minute Returns   
r <= 3  6.7007 10.4900 12.2500 16.2600 
r <= 2  24.4847 22.7600 25.3200 30.4500 
r <= 1  61.0764 39.0600 42.4400 48.4500 




















TABLE 6: PAIRWISE GRANGER CAUSALITY TEST 





Panel A: Causality Test for One-Minute Returns       
The CSI 300 future market did not 
Granger-cause the CSI 300 spot market 
969.5890 0.0000 -6.9837E-03 0.0000
The CSI 300 spot market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 futures market 
2.4201 0.0016 -4.3591E-03 0.0296
The A50 futures market did not Granger-
cause the A50 spot market 
85.4647 0.0000 -2.8207E-03 0.0056
The A50 spot market did not Granger-
cause the A50 futures market 
44.2777 0.0000 -2.3296E-03 0.0757
The CSI 300 futures market did not 
Granger-cause the A50 futures market 
158.8433 0.0000 3.8362E-04 0.1691
The A50 futures market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 futures market 
1.3226 0.1783 -7.5102E-04 0.0097
The CSI 300 spot market did not Granger-
cause the A50 spot market 
8.8562 0.0000 4.1736E-04 0.0790
The A50 spot market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 spot market 
989.7955 0.0000 -3.3328E-04 0.0348
Panel B: Causality Test for Five-Minute Returns       
The CSI 300 future market did not 
Granger-cause the CSI 300 spot market 
88.4284 0.0000 -2.0334E-02 0.0369
The CSI 300 spot market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 futures market 
1.8333 0.0574 -2.1263E-02 0.0459
The A50 futures market did not Granger-
cause the A50 spot market 
15.2561 0.0000 -7.1474E-03 0.2690
The A50 spot market did not Granger-
cause the A50 futures market 
0.6908 0.7180 -7.7389E-03 0.2572
The CSI 300 futures market did not 
Granger-cause the A50 futures market 
7.1818 0.0000 2.6294E-03 0.0746
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The A50 futures market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 futures market 
0.8169 0.6005 -3.6643E-03 0.0153
The CSI 300 spot market did not Granger-
cause the A50 spot market 
4.3790 0.0000 2.8699E-03 0.0522
The A50 spot market did not Granger-
cause the CSI 300 spot market 





TABLE 7: HASBROUCK INFORMATION SHARES 
 
  CSI 300 Spot CSI 300 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
Panel A: Hasbrouck Information Shares for One-Minute Returns  
mean   73.5764%   26.4236% 
upper bound  95.1952%  48.0424% 
lower bound   51.9576%   4.8048% 
mean 30.0657% 69.9343%     
upper bound 57.8157% 97.6843%   
lower bound 2.3157% 42.1843%     
mean     39.3504% 60.6496% 
upper bound   77.1596% 98.4587% 
lower bound     1.5413% 22.8404% 
mean 57.9567%   42.0433%   
upper bound 97.9845%  82.0710%  
lower bound 17.9290%   2.0155%   
Panel B: Hasbrouck Information Shares for Five-Minute Returns 
mean  63.1085%  36.8915% 
upper bound  96.8129%  70.5958% 
lower bound   29.4042%   3.1871% 
mean 46.6270% 53.3730%     
upper bound 89.5518% 96.2979%   
lower bound 3.7021% 10.4482%     
mean     44.3531% 55.6469% 
upper bound   88.3184% 99.6121% 
lower bound     0.3879% 11.6816% 
mean 60.6821%   39.3179%   
upper bound 95.2111%  73.8468%  





TABLE 8: GONZALO-GRANGER INFORMATION SHARES 
 CSI 300 Spot CSI 300 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
Panel A: Gonzalo and Granger Test for One -Minute Returns   
  76.7079%  23.2921% 
 23.9323% 76.0677%   
   23.7676% 76.2324% 
 77.3104%  22.6896%   
Panel B: Gonzalo and Granger Test for Five-Minute Returns   
    75.4335%   24.5665% 
 38.5172% 61.4828%   
   16.3926% 83.6074% 





















TABLE 9: HASBROUCK INFORMATION SHARES FOR SUBPERIODS 
Panel A: Hasbrouck Information Shares (05/09/2011-08/08/2011)   
  CSI 300 Spot CSI 300 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
mean  35.7111%  64.2889% 
upper bound  71.1189%  99.6968% 
lower bound   0.3032%   28.8811% 
mean 41.3143% 58.6857%     
upper bound 73.5926% 90.9639%   
lower bound 9.0361% 26.4074%     
mean     49.0312% 50.9688% 
upper bound   89.1185% 91.0560% 
lower bound     8.9440% 10.8815% 
mean 30.8376%  69.1624%  
upper bound 60.6535%  98.9783%  
lower bound 1.0217%   39.3465%   
Panel B: Hasbrouck Information Shares (08/09/2011-11/21/2011)   
  CSI 300 Spot CSI 300 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
mean  74.5129%  25.4871% 
upper bound  90.5706%  41.5447% 
lower bound   58.4553%   9.4294% 
mean 25.9393% 74.0607%     
upper bound 51.0392% 99.1605%   
lower bound 0.8395% 48.9608%     
mean     37.4586% 62.5414% 
upper bound   74.2857% 99.3684% 
lower bound     0.6316% 25.7143% 
mean 60.3198%  39.6802%  
upper bound 99.0742%  78.4346%  





TABLE 10: GONZALO-GRANGER INFORMATION SHARES FOR SUBPERIODS 
 
  CSI 300 Spot CSI 300 Futures A50 Spot A50 Futures 
Panel A: Gonzalo and Granger Information Shares (05/09/2011-08/08/2011)   
    9.0904%   90.9096% 
 42.4438% 57.5562%   
   51.0910% 48.9090% 
  14.8997%   85.1003%   
Panel B: Gonzalo and Granger Information Shares (08/09/2011-11/21/2011)   
    60.0357%   39.9643% 
 15.5640% 84.4360%   
   16.1785% 83.8215% 




























Figure 2: TIME SERIES PLOTS OF FOUR MARKETS (May 2011 to November 2011) 
 
 
Note: all indices are normalized. 
 
 
